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Creating Cascading Failure Scenarios in
Interconnected Power Systems
Badrul H. Chowdhury 1, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract: The reported catastrophic failures of power systems
from different geographical parts of the world often point to
cascading outage events of system elements that eventually had
led to system blackout. Although the initiating events of these
cascading failures may, at times, be avoidable by vegetation
management or proper protection settings, the occurrence of such
an event as well as the eventual impact cannot always be
predicted. There is much debate in the industry whether the
operator has enough time to apply countermeasures to avoid
blackouts. Besides, the process of determining effective
countermeasures cannot be deemed accurate unless a system has
been extensively studied for the occurrence of widespread
blackouts. In this paper, methods to create different cascading
failure scenarios are developed under credible contingency
conditions. The methods are tested on the 118 bus test system
and several cases are reported.

Keyword: Catastrophic failure, blackout, cascading outages,
countermeasures, system vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION

O

N August 14th, shortly after a 650 MW power plant in
Ohio failed, a 1200 MW capacity transmission line in the
same state tripped, thus starting a series of cascading
events that eventually led to the worst blackout in US history
[1]. Uncontrolled system conditions had led to several power
plants being tripped forcing power to flow through overloaded
regional lines, which in turn, tripped to avoid damage.
Large scale blackouts are relatively rare. However,
instances where blackouts have involved multiple areas point
to certain features are insightful and educational. An analysis
of recent blackout events [2]-[6], reveals an interesting theme:
June 1998 - A severe lightning storm in Minnesota initiated a
series of events, causing a system disturbance that affected
the entire Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Region and the
northwestern Ontario Hydro system of Northeast Power
Coordinating Council. Lightning struck a 345 kV line in
Minnesota and system protection de-energized the line. Some
underlying lower voltage lines became overloaded and were
tripped by protective devices. Lightning caused the removal
of a second 345 kV line and the remaining lower voltage
transmission lines in the area were automatically removed
from service. This successive removal of lines from service
continued until the entire northern MAPP Region was
1
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separated from the Eastern Interconnection, forming three
islands and resulting in the eventual blackout of the
northwestern Ontario Hydro system.
March 1999 – A zone 3 relay tripped a 440 kV line in Sao
Paulo, Brazil, resulting in cascading outages of several plants
and high voltage ac and dc lines finally leading to a total
blackout affecting 75 million people.
1997 – An ice storm in Quebec, Canada downed transmission
lines and blacked out much of New England, USA.
July 1996 – A falling tree branch in Idaho led to a cascading
failure of several power plants and transmission lines blacking
out 18 western states in the US.
August 1996 - all major transmission lines between Oregon
and California were dropped affecting 10 western states.
It is clear that transmission lines form a major link in the
cascading failure phenomenon. Although, the reasons for line
failure may be overloading, faulty protection setting,
overgrown vegetation, or any other unpredictable system or
weather condition, a line failure is often associated with
growing system oscillations, voltage or transient instability.
A power system is resilient enough that it can easily
recover from a single element outage or malfunctioning. Thus
individual blackouts are generally triggered by random events
ranging from multiple equipment failures and bad weather to
vandalism. The blackouts then typically become widespread
through a series of cascading events.
In order to understand the mechanisms of wide area blackouts
brought about by cascading element failures in interconnected
power systems, a study was undertaken with the primary goal
of forcing the system under study to the brink of collapse. The
overall objectives of this paper may be summarized as
follows:
1. Determine the vulnerability of a system to a blackout.
Although, there is no single indicator of system
vulnerability. One may study the generation levels as
compared to their individual capability curves, the line
loading levels as compared to their overloading limit, MW
and MVar reserves available, system loadability and
stability margins under critical single and multiple
contingencies, etc. These indicators may be used to
develop a composite risk level that measures the
vulnerability of the system. In general, the following
minimum information is required to develop such a
measure:
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2.

a.

System pre-condition – loading and generation
levels, congestion points, voltage profile

b.

Post-contingency condition

c.

Availability of control actions

Determine the sequence of events that lead to a
blackout. To create this sort of cascading events, one
has to simulate a disturbance, then wait for the
system to attempt to settle down, then simulate a
second disturbance and a third, or fourth and so on to
make the system fail to converge to a postdisturbance equilibrium.

Simulating cascading failures in large power systems is
always a difficult task. An insight may be gained by carefully
studying a medium-sized system that provides enough
complexity to study a slew of possibilities, including the
effect of interarea tie-line congestion, the presence of weak
lines in high load areas, limited generating capacities in
certain areas, etc.
II. THE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM
A. System diagram and operating conditions
The IEEE 118 bus test system, shown in Fig. 1 is used for
testing the cascading outage schemes. Four principle areas are
defined in the system as shown in the diagram.

AREA 2

AREA 4

AREA 1

AREA 3

Fig. 1. The 118-bus test system.

As a first step, it was desirable to identify the following
topological conditions as well as some operating conditions of
the system:
- Location of large generators and generation reserves
- Location of large loads
- Loading levels and capacity on tie-lines
- Loading levels on major transmission corridors
- Pre-disturbance voltage profile of system
- Location of high capacity transformers that connect
to the higher voltage levels.
- Location of distributed generations
- Major flowgates
Table 1 shows the interconnections flowgates in the system. It
is obvious that the transfer capability between areas 1 and 3 is
the least among all area interchanges. Therefore any system
condition that creates a stress on these tie lines may be cause
for concern.

It may also be noted that Area 4 has inadequate generation to
serve its native load and imports heavily from Area 3. Area 4
is only interconnected to Area 3. Thus, export limitation from
Area 3 to Area 4 may be a cause for concern.
TABLE 1 INTERCONNECTION FLOWGATES IN THE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM

Area Connection
Line Connection
From Area To Area From Bus To Bus
49
42
1
2
65
38
34
43
1
3
72
24
70
24
69
70
2
3
69
75
69
77
81
68
100
106
3
4
100
104
100
103

Capacity
MVA
272
258
42
27
31
164
168
94
131
92
86
182
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III. CREATING CASCADING COLLAPSE CASES
The power system is tested for overloads due to various
contingencies. Only line outages are considered as
contingencies. Generator outages or other dynamic problems
are not considered. Since lines have limited capacity to carry
power, they can easily get overloaded if the power flow on the
tripped lines is redistributed through them. This can cause
further deterioration of the overall health of the system if
those overloaded lines are also tripped.

contingencies. However, many of them result in a failure
because they cause islanding of certain buses. Out of the 37
contingencies, we identified only 12 contingencies for further
study. The results of this analysis are presented in the
following sections. It can be observed that some of these
contingencies caused wide-spread overloads, some scenarios
only created overloads that were limited to just one particular
area in the system while some resulted in overloading of
interarea tie-lines. Some of these short listed outages and their
impact are discussed in the next section.

Single line contingency screening was carried out
initially. Less than a quarter of the tested contingencies
caused a serious overloading problem. The extent of
overloading was used as a criterion for deciding further
outages in the system. This process highlighted the specific
path followed by a failure. In most of the cases, there were a
number of lines which got overloaded. Sometimes it may
happen in a real system, that the highest loaded line may
survive and a different line may trip due to different
protection settings. This possibility was considered in some
cases, whenever there were a large number of overloads. In
most cases, the selection of the specific line to be outaged
merely effects the number of steps in which the system
progresses towards collapse.

A. Outage of line 4-5
Outage of the line seems to be a comparatively wider
problem encompassing the northwestern part of Area-1. Line
4-5 connects a generator and a load at bus 4 to bus 5. Outage
of this line causes overloading of line 5-11, which in turn
causes overloads in lines 5-6, 6-7 and 7-12 as shown in Fig. 2.
Bus 7 has a small load and bus 12 has a moderately sized
generator. Taking out line 7-12, causes major overloads in
lines 3-5 and line 16-17. This is because the generator at bus
10 delivers power through line 3-5 and lines 8-30, 30-17 and
17-16.

Out of all the possible single line contingencies, 37
contingencies were identified as a set of potentially dangerous

Fig. 2. Initial effect of the outage of line 4-5 in the 118-bus test system.
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Line 3-5 is again one of the lines that connect the buses in
northwest part of Area-1 to the transformer at 5-8. Taking line
3-5 out causes a large number of major overloads. Now the
troubled region extends towards the centre of Area-1. Lines 830 and 16-17, which get overloaded in the process, are
crucial. They both connect the northwestern part of Area-1
and the crucial transformer at bus 17.
Taking out line 16-17 further overloads the same lines are
previously overloaded. Also, line 17-15 is now used to route
power to the northern region and hence gets overloaded. This
worsens the condition in the entire area. Line 14-15 gets
enormously overloaded (681 %). Overloads also spread over
entire Area-1. Lines 15-33, 33-37 and 15-19 bring power from
the eastern region of Area-1 which is connected to Area-2.
Lines 21-22, 22-23 deliver power from south to north.
Finally, taking out line 14-15 causes the system to fail.
This scenario essentially limits the power delivered by
transformer 5-8 to the north-western part of Area-1. Due to
the initiating failure, the power flow is routed via line 8-30
and transformer 30-17. In the process the lines which carry
power from transformer 30-17 get overloaded. Further outage
of these lines signals trouble.
B. Outage of line 38-65
Line 38-65 is one of the important tie-lines between Area-1
and Area-2. Quite understandably, it is also one of higher

Fig. 3. Initial effect of the outage of line 38-65 in the 118-bus test system.

capacity lines in the system. Outage of this line forces power
through other area interconnections. This line connects a very
large generator at bus 65 to the transformer at bus 38. Area-1
is a net importer of power and line 38-65 delivers a
considerable amount of power to Area-1. In absence of this
line, other area interconnections share the burden. Interconnection between Area-1 and Area-3 is made up of two
lines (24-70 and 24-72). Both these lines get overloaded as
seen in Fig. 3. In the northern part, lines connecting buses 40,
41, 42, 39 are affected. Also line 34-43 and 43-44 which are
responsible for inter-area power transfer impacted. The only
noteworthy flow reversal is in line 23-24. Real power now
flows from bus 24 to bus 23.
Outage of a second line – that between buses 23 and 24,
limits the power that can be transferred from Area-3 to Area1. Thus effectively two tie lines are lost which could supply
power to Area-1. This puts the burden on Area-2 to supply to
Area-1 through tie line 34-43. Line 43-44 delivers power to
this link. This line is highly overloaded. Also, lines 39-40 and
37-40 act as the northernmost tie line. This line mainly draws
power from lines 40-41, 40-42 and 41-42. All these lines are
affected after this outage. Not many reversals in direction of
power flow are observed. This is because even in a healthy
state, Area-1 draws power from other areas.
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If line 43-44 is tripped, then there is only one corridor for
power transfer between Area-1 and Area-2. Area-3 is already
cut off from Area-1. Thus, only the north most interconnection gets burdened with the responsibility to cater to
some loads in Area-1. Area-1 has heavy loads close to this
inter-connection. Now power is drawn from central and
eastern part of Area-2. In the process lines 40-41, 40-42, 4142, 39-40, etc. get overloaded. Line 40-41 is the highest
overloaded line. Also very strong lines like 42-49 also get
overloaded while supplying power to this inter-connection.
Power is ultimately drawn for the swing bus. This shows the
wide-spread effect of the contingency.
Outage of line 40-41 worsens the situation in Area-2. The
system is held together by just the north most interconnection. It is on the verge of being divided into two halves.
Lines 40-41 and 41-42 are equivalent to a single parallel line
to line 40-42. So, outage of line 40-41 causes overloading of
line 40-42. The extent of overloading on previously
overloaded lines increases further. Notable lines are 42-49,
47-69 and 49-69. Line 42-49 is a strong double line and still it
gets overloaded. Also, the transformer at 65-66 gets
overloaded. This shows the severity of power flows.

Outage of line 40-42 completely cuts off Area-1 from the
rest of the system. Technically this can classify as islanding,
but it actually creates two big islands. This scenario shows the
nature of interaction between area inter-connections.
C. Outage of line 64-65
Line 64-65 connects a transformer at 65-66 to another
transformer at 61-64. It is a crucial line in Area-2. In steadystate condition, this line carries power from bus 65 to bus 64.
The pre-outage line flow is very heavy. The reason behind
such a large power flow is that a large load exists at bus 59
(277MW, 113 MVar). This load is being supplied by this west
to east power transfer.
Line 64-65 takes power from the large generators at bus
65 and bus 66 and delivers it to the eastern part of Area-2.
This area has major loads at buses 59, 60 and 61. Outage of
line 64-65 causes overloads on line 62-66 and line 62-67 as
seen in Fig. 4. These are two alternative paths for taking
power to the eastern region of Area-2. Power is also seen to
flow to the North and then to the East and finally looping back
to the South so as to serve these major loads. Thus immediate
overloading occurs on lines 62-66 and 62-67. No significant
changes in direction of power flow are noticed.

Fig. 4. Initial effect of the outage of line 64-65 in the 118-bus test system.

A second outage - that of line 62-67, then eliminates one
of the two remaining paths for delivering power directly from
the western to the eastern region of Area-2. This outage shifts
the flow on line 62-66. It also causes a flow from South to

North in Area-2. This power further flows towards the East
and loops back to the South. As a result, lines 50-57, 54-56,
56-57, etc. get overloaded. This outage also overloads the
transformer at 65-66.
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Now, an outage of line 63-66 eliminates any possibility of
West-East power transfer in Area-2. In order to serve the
heavy loads at buses 59, 60, 55, 56, etc., power now flows
from South to North in Area-2. For example - the power now
flows from 66 to 49 to 50/51 to 57/58 to 56 to 55 to 59. As a
result the lines which run South-North get overloaded. Even
some of the lines such as 47-49 which run West-East
contribute to this flow and get overloaded in the process.
Almost all the lines which are connected to bus 49 get
overloaded. This is so, because bus 49 is the junction from
where power can flow to North and then to East. Line 49-54 is
overloaded in spite of being a strong double line. Line 54-59
shows a reversal in the direction of real power flow. It now
supplies power from bus 54 to bus 59. Earlier, bus 59 was
drawing power from the transformer at 64-61. Line 56-58
which carries power from South to North is the most heavily
loaded line.
Outage of line 56-58 limits the South-North flow to an
extent. This causes overloads in lines carrying power from the
western region of Area-2 to the eastern region. Line 54-56 is
one of them. Other lines which carry power from South to
North are further overloaded. Lines which were previously
overloaded are now at dangerously high overload levels. Also,
the transformer at 65-66 is overloaded. Both these buses have
major generations. Line 54-56 is the highest overloaded line.

Fig. 5. Initial effect of the outage of line 89-92 in the 118-bus test system.

As a next step, outage of line 54-56 limits the West-East
power flow that ultimately flows towards bus 59, 60, 55 and
56, which have heavy loads. Line 54-55 is the only line which
can accomplish this West-East flow. Also, most of the power
is drawn from lines which run South-North. In the process, all
lines running North from bus 49 get overloaded. The extent of
overloading in the South-North lines reaches dangerous
levels.
Outage of a further line, that between buses 54 and 55
leaves only one option for the power transfer: 49 to 51 to 57
to 56 to 59. This path gets highly overloaded. Line 56-57 is
the weakest line amongst these lines. Naturally this line is the
highest overloaded line. All the previously overloaded lines
experience a more severe overload.
If line 56-57 is now tripped, then the system reaches a
blackout state.
D. Outage of line 89-92
Line 89-92 is a very strong connection between a major
generator at bus 89 and a large load at bus 92. Outage of this
line does not have a wide-spread effect on the network in
Area-3 since a second circuit exists to the load at bus 92. This
second circuit does get overloaded. The North-South
connection 82-83 also gets overloaded as seen in Fig. 5.
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Line 82-83 is located in the southern part of Area-3. Outage
of this line further overloads line 91-92 which serves a large
load at bus 92.
Outage of line 91-92 put the burden on other lines that
can bring in power to this region. Lines 94-100 and 100-101
serve this purpose and are therefore overloaded.
If line 100-101 is outaged, then the overloading occurs
over a wider region in Area 3. Line 94-100 is now more
severely overloaded.
Outage of line 94-100 causes a wide-spread problem in
this region of Area-3. Line 95-96 is the highest overloaded
line. Most of the lines are not severely overloaded at this
point.
Outage of line 95-96 increases the extent of overloading
in the previously overloaded lines. As a result, line 94-96,
which acts like a parallel path to line 94-96 is dangerously
overloaded. Outage of this line causes a blackout.
E. Outage of transformer 37-38
The transformer 37-38 is located in the eastern part of
Area-1. The outage events caused by this contingency seem to
be limited to this particular region. But overloading occurs
over a wider area. This transformer receives power from
Area-2 and delivers it to Area-1. This makes its location
critical. Outage of this transformer hampers the ability of the
system to serve the heavy loads in Area–1. This outage
ultimately affects a wide portion of the system.

Fig. 6. Initial effect of the outage of transformer 37-38 in the 118-bus test system.

The outage of transformer 37-38 overloads line 15-33
which serves heavy load at buses 15 and 33. There is a cluster
of heavy loads at buses 18, 19, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 39. All
these loads are geographically close. Thus outage of the
transformer at 37-38 overloads these lines. Line 15-33 carries
power mostly from the generators in Area-1. This outage also
overloads lines 40-42 and 43-44 in Area - 2. which bring in
power to Area -1 as shown in Fig. 6. Also, a reversal of real
power flow is observed in line 19-34. Power now flows from
bus 19 to bus 34.
Outage of line 15-33 causes overloading over a wider
region. Line 19-34 serves the same purpose as line 15-33.
Hence, it takes the brunt of losing line 15-33. Line 19-34 now
brings as much power from Area-1 generators as possible.
Naturally, line 19-34 is the highest overloaded line after this
outage. Heavy power transfer ensues between buses 19 and
34. Two lines in Area-2 which are close to Area-1 get
dangerously overloaded. Line 39-40 is an area tie line which
gets overloaded.
Outage of line 19-34 has a tremendous impact on almost
all lines in the northwestern and most of the western part of
Area-2. Due to limited transmission capacity, Area-1
generators can no longer supply the heavy loads at buses 18,
19, 33, 34, 35, 36, etc. As a result, more power is fetched
from Area-2 and the inter-area tie lines get overloaded.
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The extent of overloading is dangerously high. Line 37-40 is
one of the area interconnections. It also shows reversal of
power flow after this outage. The same is the case for line 3940. Line 34-43 is the only inter-area connection between
Area-1 and Area-2 that is not connected to the outaged
transformer 38-37. Because of this, line 34-43 gets
overloaded. Line 43-44 is the line adjacent to this interarea
connection between area-1 and area-2. Being a comparatively
weak line, it gets heavily overloaded. Overloads are observed
even in the central part of Area-2. This implies that the region
of impact is considerably large. At this stage we actually have
an overloading of a transformer 65-66 which is very close to
the swing bus. This creates a critical situation. Most of the
flows in Area-2 are from the East to the West.
Outage of line 43-44 restricts the power transfer through
the area interconnection 34-43. This stresses other interconnections and increases the severity of overloading of the
previously overloaded lines. Now the heavy loads in Area-1
are supplied through the northern interconnection between
Area-1 and Area-2. Line 40-41 is the heaviest loaded line and
it is responsible for the interarea power transfer in the
northern region. One interesting observation is the
overloading of one of the area interconnections between Area2 and Area3, due to the transformer outage in Area-1. This
shows how the initial failure has spread throughout.
Removal of line 40-41 also causes a similar effect of
increasing the severity of the overloading. Naturally, line 4042 bears the brunt and gets overloaded to a dangerously high
level. This outage also affects lines in the far eastern region of
the system. Line 64-65 is a crucial line for supplying loads in
that region. It gets overloaded in the process. One more
dangerous consequence is the overloading of transformer at
68-69. This is a crucial transformer, because it is connected to
a large generator in the system. Finally, outage of line 40-42
leads to a blackout.

The work reported in this paper has investigated only the
effect cascading failure conditions on the possibility of
blackout. The events simulated were deemed to be probable
from the perspective of the level of overloading. Although a
line with the highest level of overloading may be picked to be
the most likely line to fail under an emergency, it does not
always happen this way as seen in many of the reported
blackouts. Because of the preponderance of zone 3 backup
relays and that of hidden failures, it is not unusual to see an
underlying line close to the point of the initial disturbance to
start the final cascading events that eventually lead to a
blackout.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Even though the security criteria are met for N-0 and N-1
conditions, a power system could be threatened by an
impending blackout if certain conditions are forced on the
system. Such conditions are created by cascading failures,
some of which cannot be predicted either because they are
random events or because of the current lack of intent on the
planner’s part or the lack of computational power to look into
every single event possibility under every single possible
condition. One cannot blame the planner for lack of intent to
analyze all different possibilities because, not all scenarios are
probable. As for the current lack of computational capability,
like a chess game, the power system can provide security
scenarios that are combinatorially intractable, and therefore,
such a task has never been undertaken.
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